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Following the much anticipated Supreme Court of Canada decision in Beals v. Saldanha1, the 
"real and substantial connection" test established in Morguard Investments Ltd. v. De Savoye 2
was extended to apply equally to the recognition of foreign judgments.3 Thus, the principles 
of comity, reciprocity and order and fairness4 were held to apply to originating actions 
commenced in Canada involving foreign litigants (either as plaintiff or defendant). 
Moreover, the Beals v. Saldanha decision confirmed that where the “real and substantial 
connection” test is otherwise met (i.e. consent-based jurisdiction, presence-based jurisdiction 
or assumed jurisdiction)5 the only available defences to a domestic defendant seeking to have 
a Canadian court refuse enforcement of a foreign judgment are fraud, natural justice and 
public policy.6 Some commentators have expressed concern that the Beals v. Saldanha 
decision will potentially expose Canadian defendants to exorbitant U.S. jury awards, which 
often include treble and punitive damages which far exceed comparable Canadian damage 
assessments.7
In the wake of Beals v. Saldanha, the scope and applicability of the defences of natural justice 
and public policy were recently appraised by the Ontario Superior Court of Justice and Court 
of Appeal in The United States of America v. Shield Development Co.8
In USA v. Shield, U.S. Department of Justice (Environmental Enforcement Section, 
Environment and Natural Resources Division) [“USA”] sought to recover environmental 
clean-up costs in removing hazardous substances from the Essex copper processing site in 
Milford, Beaver County, Utah originally owned by two Canadian corporations, The Shield 
Development Co. Ltd. ["Shield"] and Anyox Metals Ltd. ["Anyox"]. Shield operated a 
processing facility on the site under a lease from 1969 to 1971. In 1971, Shield subleased the 
facility to Essex Group International [“Essex”] who operated it from 1971 to 1974. In 1979, 
ownership of the property was transferred to Shield. In 1984, Shield sold the property to 
Anyox pursuant to a power of sale. The transfer was not registered and Shield remained as 
the registered titleholder. John Patrick Sheridan is the president of both Shield and Anyox.  
Both Shield and Anyox denied they had caused the environmental pollution and alleged that 
it had been caused by Essex. 9 The U.S.A. then commenced proceedings in the United States 
District Court in Utah under federal jurisdiction,10 seeking declaratory judgment against 
Shield and Anyox for the USA’s environmental clean-up costs pursuant to section 107 of 
under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA).11 
Following a labyrinthine procedural history,12 the USA eventually obtained “summary 
judgment” jointly and severally against Shield and Anyox in the amount of US$242,614.93 
plus costs. The U.S.A. then commenced an action in Ontario to enforce its Utah judgment 
and moved for summary judgment before Herman, J.. Shield and Anyox resisted the motion 
and argued that there were two triable issues: (1) whether the steps taken by U.S.A. to obtain 
judgment in Utah amounted to a breach of natural justice due to ineffective or improper 
service on the defendants of a number of court documents; and (2) whether the U.S.A.'s 
2decision to sue two Canadian corporations and not the American corporation responsible 
for the environmental pollution was contrary to public policy. Herman, J. rejected the 
defences of natural justice and public policy and granted summary judgment against Shield 
and Anyox. 13 In a brief endorsement, the Ontario Court of Appeal dismissed Shield and 
Anyox’s appeal stating in part: 
 
[3] As stated by the respondent, the real essence of this matter is that the appellants had 
received adequate notice of the U.S. proceeding and had adequate opportunity to raise any 
defence of fact and law before the U.S. District Court. In effect, they now plead the 
consequences of their decision to walk away from the U.S. proceeding, to which they attorned, 
in an attempt to create a triable issue. Moreover, when the appellants learned of the U.S. 
judgment, neither appellant appealed nor moved to have the judgment set aside. 14
My thesis is that the defence of natural justice mandates that “form follow function”.15 
Procedural rules (the “form”) must be predicated on the intended purpose (“order and 
fairness”).  Although USA v. Shield is also informative in respect of the public policy 
defence,16 the Ontario court’s analysis of the defence of natural justice begs scrutiny for 
three reasons.  
 
First, the defence of natural justice is the fulcrum between the principles of order and 
fairness that forms the basis for foreign judgment enforcement. The judicial distemper 
exhibited in the majority and dissenting opinions in Beals v. Saldanha, was no less muted in 
the divided court’s analysis of the defence of natural justice. Justice Major, writing for the 
six-to-three majority, 17 disagreed generally with Justice Lebel’s “purposive and flexible” 
approach18 to the traditional defences and downplayed the significance of lack of notice and 
unfamiliarity with foreign legal procedure. According to Major, J., the defence of natural 
justice requires the enforcing court to determine whether the defendant was granted fair 
process by the foreign legal system when the foreign court granted judgment. Fair process is 
one that “reasonably guarantees basic procedural safeguards such as judicial independence 
and fair ethical rules governing the participants in the judicial system.” It also includes a 
requirement that the defendant be given adequate notice of the claim and an opportunity to 
defend. Major, J. further noted that this “assessment is easier when the foreign legal system 
is either similar to or familiar to Canadian courts.” 19 Justice Major defined the defence of 
natural justice as follows: 
 
The defence of natural justice is restricted to the form of the foreign procedure, to due 
process, and does not relate to the merits of the case. The defence is limited to the procedure 
by which the foreign court arrived at its judgment. However, if that procedure, while valid 
there, is not in accordance with Canada's concept of natural justice, the foreign judgment will 
be rejected. The defendant carries the burden of proof and, in this case, failed to raise any 
reasonable apprehension of unfairness.20 
Justice Major further noted: 
 
In Canada, natural justice has frequently been viewed to include, but is not limited to, the 
necessity that a defendant be given adequate notice of the claim made against him and that he 
be granted an opportunity to defend….   
 
3LeBel J. would expand the defence of natural justice by interpreting the right  to receive notice 
of a foreign action to include notice of the legal steps to be taken by the defendant where the 
legal system differs from that of Canada’s and of the consequences flowing from a decision to 
defend, or not defend, the foreign action.  Where such notice was not given, he would deny 
enforcement of the resulting judgment.  No such burden should rest with the foreign plaintiff.  Within 
Canada, defendants are presumed to know the law of the jurisdiction seized with an action against them.  
Plaintiffs are not required to expressly or implicitly notify defendants of the steps that they must take when 
notified of a claim against them.  This approach is equally appropriate in the context of international 
litigation.  To find otherwise would unduly complicate cross-border transactions and hamper trade with 
Canadian parties.  A defendant to a foreign action instituted in a jurisdiction with a real and substantial 
connection to the action or parties can reasonably be expected to research the law of the foreign 
jurisdiction…[emphasis added]21 
Conversely, Justice Le Bel argued that the defence of natural justice “concerns the procedure 
by which the foreign court reached its decision.”22 If a defendant can establish that the 
process by which the foreign judgment was obtained was contrary to the Canadian 
conception of natural justice, then the foreign judgment should not be enforced.23 
Furthermore, Le Bel, J. suggested that adequate notice should include "alerting the defendant 
to the consequences of any procedural steps taken or not taken . . . as well as to the 
allegations that will be adjudicated at trial.”24
In a separate dissent, Binnie, J. voiced similar concerns: 
 
Proper notice is a function of the particular circumstances of the case giving rise to the foreign default judgment.  
In this case, in my view, there was a failure of notification amounting to a breach of natural justice.  In these 
circumstances, the Ontario courts ought not to give effect to the Florida judgment. 
…
When a Canadian resident is served with a legal process from within his or her own 
jurisdiction, he or she is presumed to know the law and the risks attendant with the notice.  
There can be no such presumption across different legal systems. 
 
As the basis of the respondents’ judgment is default of pleading, this lack of notification goes to 
the heart of the present appeal.25 
The defence of natural justice is essentially a restatement of the well-established legal 
principle of “audi alteram partem”26 or "hear the other party"27 requiring that the parties to a 
dispute be given adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard.28 Put another way, without 
procedural justice, order trumps fairness. The defence of natural justice is further 
adumbrated by Professor Lawrence Slocum in his article “Procedural Justice” wherein the 
learned author states: 
 
The Participation Principle requires that the arrangements for the resolution of civil disputes 
be structured to provide each interested party with a right to adequate participation. The 
Accuracy Principle requires that the arrangements for the resolution of civil disputes should be 
structured so as to maximize the chances of achieving the legally correct outcome in each 
proceeding. Together, the two principles provide guidance where guidance is needed, both for 
the architects of procedural design and reform and for judges who apply general procedural 
rules to particular cases.29 
4Second, the factual and evidentiary record and procedural history in USA v. Shield both 
demonstrate that the standards of American due process and Canadian procedural fairness 
differ in material respects vis-à-vis default and/or summary judgments.  
 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the rights of unrepresented (pro se)30 corporate 
defendants to notice and right of appearance in U.S. federal and state courts are markedly 
different than those in Canada generally, and in Ontario, specifically. Therefore, a 
comparative analysis of the U.S. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, local Utah State Rules and 
the Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure will identify the need for further refinement and 





From June 1st to June 3rd, 1992, the Utah Department of Environmental Quality, Division of 
Environmental Response and Remediation ("DERR") inspected the Essex site and took 
samples. By letter dated April 5, 1993, DERR reported the results to Mr. Sheridan, president 
of both Shield and Anyox, and further requested that Shield and Anyox enter into an 
agreement to perform a complete assessment of the environmental threats associated with 
the site. DERR sent a follow-up letter on December 22, 1993 but Shield and Anyox failed to 
respond to either letter. On February 28, 1994, DERR notified the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency ("EPA") of its findings. On May 26, 1994, as a result of its own 
investigations, the EPA requested funds to perform "time critical removal action". On 
January 6, 1995, the EPA sent a "Notice of Potential Liability and Request for Information" 
by registered mail to Shield’s registered corporate address at 150 York Street, Suite #1614, 
Toronto (to Mr. Sheridan’s attention as president of Shield) informing Shield that it was 
potentially liable for clean-up costs. Interestingly, the essentially identical Notice of Potential 
Liability was faxed to Mr. Sheridan, on behalf of Anyox, on February 28, 1995, but the USA 
conceded that it was sent by registered mail to an incorrect address (#7 King Street East, 
#1404, Toronto). 31 
On March 3, 1995, the EPA began its removal, cleanup and disposal of the onsite 
contaminants.32 On March 22, 1995, the EPA then sent a "Second Issuance of General 
Notice and Information Request" to Mr. Sheridan as president of Anyox, to which Mr. 
Sheridan responded on April 19, 1995 and May 2, 1995, on behalf of Anyox and Shield, 
respectively. The EPA then sent a “Demand for Payment” letter to Mr. Sheridan, as 
President of Anyox, dated September 26 1995 for the removal costs in the amount of 
US$103,353.69, to which Mr. Sheridan did not respond. The EPA sent a second demand for 
payment to Mr. Sheridan on July 1, 1996, and advised him that the costs now totalled 
$162,935.00 plus US$14,653.78. Notably, although the EPA also sent the same “Demand for 
Payment” letters to Essex Group, Inc., apparently without reply, it elected to sue only Shield 
and Anyox under the CERCLA environmental legislation. 33 
5Utah District Court Procedural History 
 
The following is a chronology of events leading to the Utah District Court judgment: 
 
May 26, 1998 -- U.S.A. commences an action against Shield and Anyox in the United States 
District Court in Utah.34 
July 13, 1998 -- The Complaint is served on Shield and Anyox through personal service on 
Mr. Sheridan at his home at 14 Parklane Circle, Don Mills, Ontario, by leaving a copy of a 
"Summons in a Civil Action" and a copy of the Complaint (similar to a Statement of Claim 
in Ontario)  with Marjorie Sheridan, Mr. Sheridan’s spouse pursuant to Rule 4(h)(1) of the 
United States Federal Rules of Civil Procedure [hereinafter “Fed. R. Civ. P.”] 35 
July 27, 1998 -- Ontario counsel agent retained by the U.S. Department of Justice writes a 
letter confirming that the process server had served the Complaints and Summons on Mr. 
Sheridan at his home at 14 Parklane Circle (home address). He stated that the “corporations 
vacated their business address at Suite 1614, 150 York Street Toronto [corporate address] in 
mid-April/early May 1998 and Mr. Sheridan now operates from his home.”36 
August 26, 1999 -- Shield and Anyox retain counsel in Utah who file Answers to the 
Complaint (similar to a Statement of Defence). Neither of the corporate defendants 
contests jurisdiction of the U.S. District Court, albeit choice of venue is not 
preliminarily conceded.  37 38 
November 23, 1998 -- the USA submits its Initial Disclosures.39 
December 2, 1998 – Defendants' Utah counsel submits their Initial Disclosures which 
incorrectly states that the defendants' corporate address is 150 York St., Toronto.40 
September 3, 1999 – Defendants’ Utah Counsel files a motion to withdraw as counsel on the 
basis that they had not received payment and that Mr. Sheridan had not communicated with 
them. The motion is served on the defendants by mailing them a copy to the corporate 
address. The motion materials indicate that the defendant's address is the corporate 
address.41 
September 9, 1999 -- the USA serves its "First Set of Requests for Admissions" 42 on Shield 
and Anyox pursuant to Rule 36(a) of the Fed. R. Civ. P. by serving their Utah counsel and by 
mistakenly sending it to the defendants at “150 New York St.”, a non-existent Toronto 
address, instead of 150 York St, the former corporate address which Shield and Anyox 
abandoned in 1998 but maintained a mailbox until 2003.43 
September 10, 1999 -- the U.S. District Court grants Utah counsel’s motion to withdraw 
pursuant to Rule 83-1.4(a)(2) of the Rules of Practice for the United States District Court for 
the District of Utah [the local Fed. R. Civ. P.] effective on September 14, 1999. A copy of 
that order is mailed to Shield and Anyox at the former corporate address. 44 
6December 16, 1999 -- the United States files a Motion for Summary Judgment on the basis 
that Shield and Anyox has failed to respond to the Request for Admissions and were 
therefore deemed to have admitted the Requests. A copy of that motion is also mistakenly 
sent to “150 New York St.”. Unsurprisingly, neither Shield nor Anyox file a response to the 
Motion for Summary judgment. 45
February 5, 2000 -- Judge Ted Stewart of the U.S. District schedules a hearing date on April 
12, 2000. Copies of the order setting the hearing date are sent to Shield and Anyox at what 
Justice Herman regards as the “correct” corporate address. 46
June 19, 2000 -- Judge Stewart grants Judgment to the USA following the defendants’ failure 
to respond or appear at the hearing.47A copy of the order is mailed to Shield and Anyox at 
the “correct” corporate address. Justice Herman observed that neither Shield nor Anyox 
appeal the order nor move to set it aside within the one-year limitation period under Rule 
60(b)(1) of the Fed. R. Civ. P., noting that: 
 
Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for relief from a final judgment in 
a variety of situations including "(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect". The 
rule provides that motions to obtain relief under Rule 60(b)(1) must be made within one year 
after the judgment was entered or taken. The defendants submit that they are therefore 
precluded from moving to set aside the judgment, since they were not aware of the judgment 
until after the one year had passed. 
 
The plaintiff argues, however, that the defendants could seek a remedy under Rule 60(b)(6) for 
"any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment". The time limitation for 
that provision is not one year, but is "within a reasonable time". 48 
Comparative Procedural Analysis 
 
The American and Canadian laws of civil procedure are generally thought to be similar, 
having derived from the same historical antecedents of English common law. Furthermore, 
determining procedural fairness is necessarily subjective: a domestic court presumes that its 
own legal system and rules of procedure are fair to litigants. Nevertheless, the defence of 
natural justice is best considered by juxtaposing both procedural regimes under the following 
four categories: 
 
(1) Withdrawal or removal as counsel of record;  
(2) Standing for unrepresented (pro se) corporate litigants; 
(3)  Sanctions for failure to respond to requests to admit; and 
(4)  Legal standard for summary judgment and default judgment. 
 
(1) Withdrawal or removal as counsel of record 
 
Utah Counsel's motion to withdraw as counsel of record was brought on September 3, 1999. 
The US served its "First Set of Requests for Admissions" on Utah Counsel and to the wrong 
corporate address in Toronto. Judge David Sam allowed withdrawal of defendants' counsel 
by Order dated September on September 10, 1999 pursuant to Rule 83.1.4(a)(2) of the Utah 
Federal Rules of Practice which reads in part: 
7DUCivR 83-1.4 ATTORNEYS - WITHDRAWAL OR REMOVAL OF ATTORNEY 
(a) Withdrawal and Substitution. No attorney will be permitted to withdraw or be 
substituted as attorney of record in any pending action except by written application and by 
order of the court. All applications for withdrawal must set forth the reasons therefor, together 
with the name, address, and telephone number of the client, as follows:  
... 
(2) Without Client's Consent. Where the withdrawing attorney has not obtained the 
written consent of the client, the application must be in the form of a motion that 
must be served upon the client and all other parties or their attorneys. The motion must 
be accompanied by a certificate of the moving attorney that (i) the client has been notified in writing of 
the status of the case including the dates and times of any scheduled court proceedings, pending 
compliance with any existing court orders, and the possibility of sanctions; or (ii) the client cannot be 
located or, for whatever other reason, cannot be notified of the pendency of the motion and the status of 
the case. 49 
(b) Responsibilities of Party Upon Removal. Whenever an attorney withdraws or dies, is 
removed or suspended, or for any other reason ceases to act as attorney of record, the party 
represented by such attorney must notify the clerk of the appointment of another attorney or of his decision to 
appear pro se within twenty (20) days or before any further court proceedings are conducted. If substituting 
counsel, the party also must provide the clerk with the name, current telephone number, 
address, and, where applicable, Utah State Bar identification number of substituting counsel. If 
the party is proceeding pro se, the party must provide the party's address and telephone number to the clerk. 50 
[emphasis added] 
 
Conversely, Rule 74 (formerly 4-506) of the local Utah State Rules provides as follows:  
 
Rule 74. Withdrawal of Counsel 
(a) If a motion is not pending and a certificate of readiness for trial has not been filed, an 
attorney may withdraw from the case by filing with the court and serving on all parties a notice 
of withdrawal. The notice of withdrawal shall include the address of the attorney’s client and a 
statement that no motion is pending and no certificate of readiness for trial has been filed. If a 
motion is pending or a certificate of readiness for trial has been filed, an attorney may not 
withdraw except upon motion and order of the court. The motion to withdraw shall describe 
the nature of any pending motion and the date and purpose of any scheduled hearing. 
 
(b) If an attorney withdraws, dies, is suspended from the practice of law, is disbarred, or is removed from the 
case by the court, the opposing party shall serve a Notice to Appear or Appoint Counsel on the unrepresented 
party, informing the party of the responsibility to appear personally or appoint counsel. A copy of the Notice to 
Appear or Appoint Counsel must be filed with the court. No further proceedings shall be held in the case until 
20 days after filing the Notice to Appear or Appoint Counsel unless the unrepresented party waives the time 
requirement or unless otherwise ordered by the court. [emphasis added] 
 
(c) Substitution of counsel. An attorney may replace the counsel of record by filing and serving 
a notice of substitution of counsel signed by former counsel, new counsel and the client. Court 
approval is not required if new counsel certifies in the notice of substitution that counsel will 
comply with the existing hearing schedule and deadlines. 51 
8The differences are notable, if not, striking. Under the Utah Federal Rules of Practice, the 
onus is on the unrepresented party (former client) to notify the court and opposing counsel 
of new representation or intention to act in person. By contrast, under the Utah State Rules, 
the onus is on the opposing party who is required to serve a Notice to Appear or Appoint 
Counsel to the unrepresented party. The failure to deliver the appropriate Notice to Appear 
or Appoint Counsel has been held by the Utah Supreme Court as sufficient grounds to set 
aside default judgment against a personal defendant. 52 53 
By comparison, under Rule 15 of the Ontario Rules, a party’s solicitor may only withdraw or 
be removed as solicitor of record where (1) a Notice of Change of Solicitors from successor 
counsel is served; (2) the personal defendant delivers a Notice of Intention to Act in Person; 
or (3) by order of the court. 54One may argue that Rule 74 of the Utah State Rules is much 
fairer than the corresponding Rule 83.1-4(b) of the Utah Federal Rules of Practice, as it 
provides a procedural safeguard to unrepresented personal defendants. Whether or not the 
same is true for unrepresented corporate defendants is considered below. 
(2) Standing for unrepresented (pro se) corporate litigants  
 
The Utah Code does not include any provision requiring a corporation to be represented by 
legal counsel.  A statute did exist, Utah Code Ann. § 78-51-40, prohibiting corporations and 
associations from practicing law, but it was repealed by Laws 2001, c. 4 § 3, eff. April 30, 
2001.  The prohibition appears to remain in effect under case law, however.  The Utah 
Supreme Court observed in Tracy-Burke Assoc. v. Dept. of Employment Security, "It has long been 
the law of [Utah] that a corporate litigant must be represented in court by a licensed 
attorney."  55 
There is no corresponding federal rule prohibiting a corporation from representing itself in 
court.  However, the prohibition exists through case law, including a U.S. Supreme Court 
decision in which the court recognized, "It has been the law for the better part of two 
centuries . . . that a corporation may appear in the federal courts only through licensed 
counsel."  56 Similarly, in CLD Construction, Inc. v. City of San Ramon 57 the California Court of 
Appeal held that a corporation may not represent itself in a court of record either in propria 
persona or through an officer or agent who is not an attorney. However, the California Court 
of Appeal did note that: 
 
In federal courts there has been a consistent pattern during the last 40 years to dismiss a 
corporation that initially appears via a nonattorney officer or shareholder only after the 
corporation has been given a reasonable time to secure counsel.58 59 
9Interestingly, in USA v. Shield, the plaintiff’s affidavit also contained an exhibit memo dated 
May 3, 2002 from a US Department of Justice paralegal specialist, which read in part: 
 
“ The issues to be research [sic] in this case are whether clients are required to respond to 
pleadings received after counsel has withdrawn from the case and whether the clients and/or 
defendants can suffer default for lack of response. 
 
The courts have repeatedly held that corporations and other organizations, such as Shield 
Development Co., Ltd. and Anyox Metals Ltd., must be represented by counsel. Failure to 
appoint substitute counsel can justify entry of a default, if the corporation was notified that it 
may not proceed pro se. See R Maganlal v. M.G. Chemical Co., Inc., 1996 WL 420234 
(S.D.N.Y.) July 25, 1996). The Defendants, Shield Development and Anyox Metals, should 
have appointed substitute counsel to handle their case shortly after Judge Sam granted the 
Motion to Withdraw as Counsel for the Defendants in September 1999, to date Notice of 
Substitution of Counsel has not been filed with the Court. The Defendants’ failure to appoint 
substitute counsel has provided DOJ with additional justification for entering default 
judgment.” 60
A contrario, the Ontario Rules do not contain an absolute prohibition against pro se corporate 
litigants.61 62Moreover, the Ontario Rules mandate that an order for removal of counsel as 
solicitor of record for a corporation must contain the following text: 
 
15.04(6)  A client that is a corporation shall, within 30 days after being served with the order 
removing the solicitor from the record, 
 (a)    appoint a new solicitor of record by serving a notice under subrule 15.03 (2); or 
 (b)    obtain and serve an order under subrule 15.01 (2) granting it leave to be 
represented by a person other than a solicitor.  O. Reg. 739/94, s. 1 (2); O. Reg. 536/96, s. 1. 
 (7)  If the corporation fails to comply with subrule (6), 
 (a)    the court may dismiss its proceeding or strike out its defence; and 
 (b)    in an appeal, 
(i) a judge of the appellate court may, on motion, dismiss the 
corporation’s appeal, or 
(ii) the court hearing the appeal may deny it the right to be heard.  
O. Reg. 171/98, s. 1.63 
The principles of order and fairness are reflected in the provisions of Rule 15.04 allowing a 
corporation to participate in the courts without legal counsel and to be notified of its rights, 
obligations and sanctions for inaction, following withdrawal by counsel. It is submitted that 
an additional factor for the defence of natural justice should be a determination of whether 
the foreign judgment was granted by the foreign court whose procedural system afforded a 
corporate defendant rights of appearance and notice similar to the domestic enforcing court.  
 
(3)  Sanctions for failure to respond to requests to admit 
 
The sanctions for failure to respond to documentary requests to admit differ between the 
American and Ontario procedural systems. A party’s failure to respond to a request for 
admissions under Rule 36 of Fed. R. Civ. P. may result in a material fact being deemed 
admitted and subject the party to an adverse grant of summary judgment.64 However, in the 
case of U.S. v. Turk,65 District Judge Hebert F. Murray held that the court was not bound to 
deem as admitted unanswered requests for admissions by a pro se defendant, where to do so 
10
would be contrary to the interests of justice and unduly prejudicial to the defendant’s rights. 
Judge Murray expressed his reluctance “to grant summary judgment against a pro se 
defendant based solely upon his failure to comply with the discovery requirements of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” 66 Although the Ontario Rules also contemplate Requests 
to Admit and provide for deemed admissions where no response is forthcoming, 67 they also 
contain the following important caveat under Rule 19.01 which reads: 
 
FACTS MUST ENTITLE PLAINTIFF TO JUDGMENT 
 
19.06 A plaintiff is not entitled to judgment on a motion for judgment or at trial merely 
because the facts alleged in the statement of claim are deemed to be admitted, unless the facts 
entitle the plaintiff to judgment.  R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, r. 19.06. 
 
The potential harshness of facing a default judgment resulting from the failure to respond to 
admissions effectively deprives a party of the opportunity to contest the merits of a case. 
While judicial policy may be to insure the orderly disposition of cases and parties to a lawsuit 
must comply with the rules of procedure, where a pro se corporation does not have any right 
of appearance or right to file documents, its knowledge of the law and legal procedure (e.g. 
whether it is entitled to withdraw admissions or respond to a request to admissions) is a non-
sequitur. Therefore, it is submitted that an additional factor for the defence of natural justice 
should be whether or not a foreign rule of procedure was intended to be used as a technical 
weapon to defeat the rights of pro se litigants to have their cases fairly judged on the merits. 68 
(4)  Legal standard for summary judgment and/or default judgment. 
 
In her reasons, Justice Herman noted the Ontario test for summary judgment as follows: 
 
[5] Rule 20.04(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194 provides that the 
court shall grant summary judgment if it is satisfied that there is no genuine issue for trial. The 
United States submits that the only genuine issue to be determined is a question of law and 
that is whether the judgment in the United States meets the applicable test in Canadian law for 
the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. It is its position that there are no 
factual issues for the court to decide and no genuine issues for trial.  
 …
[7] The defendants further submit that, while it may be that at trial the burden of 
establishing either of these two defences rests with them, that is not the case in a summary 
judgment motion. They cite the decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal in Hi-Tech Group 
Inc. v. Sears Canada Inc. (2001), 52 O.R. (3d) 97, [2001] O.J. No. 33 (C.A.), at p. 105 O.R., as 
authority for the proposition that the legal burden to establish that there is no genuine issue 
for trial rests on the moving party and does not shift. However, that principle does not relieve 
the party opposing summary judgment of the need to demonstrate that there is "a real chance 
of success" (Guarantee Co. of North America v. Gordon Capital Corp., [1999] 3 S.C.R. 423, 
[1999] S.C.J. No. 60, at para. 27). 69 
11
There are a few American cases in which the defendant's failure to appear in court results in 
summary judgment.  In Fireman's Ins. Co. of Newark, New Jersey v. Herbert, 70the court granted 
summary judgment against the pro se defendants after they had failed to respond to plaintiff's 
requests for admissions, or to appear at the hearing.  The court noted its discretion in 
granting summary judgment and its leniency towards pro se defendants in warning the 
consequences of failing to respond.  The responses to plaintiff's requests for admission were 
deemed admitted upon defendants' failure to respond, which formed the basis for summary 
judgment. 71 
Similarly, in Gittens v. Garlocks Sealing Technologies, 72 the New York court granted summary 
judgment against a pro se plaintiff who had failed to respond to defendant's motion for 
summary judgment and to appear at the hearing.  While the court noted the failure to 
respond and appear, in and of itself, did not constitute grounds for summary judgment, the 
statement of facts were deemed admitted through plaintiff's failure to respond and, "if those 
facts show summary judgment is appropriate, summary judgment should be granted." 73
Rule 56(c) of Fed. R. Civ. P. specifies that “admissions on file” can be an appropriate basis 
for granting summary judgment. 74Since Rule 36 admissions, whether express or by default, 
are conclusive as to the matters admitted, they cannot be overcome at the summary 
judgment stage by contradictory affidavit testimony or other evidence in the summary 
judgment record.75 Instead, the proper course for a litigant that wishes to avoid the 
consequences of failing to timely respond to Rule 36 requests for admission is to move the 
court to amend or withdraw the default admissions in accordance with the standard outlined 
in Rule 36(b).76 Although Rule 36(b) of Fed. R. Civ. P. provides discretion to the court to 
allow a party to withdraw or amendment of an admission, this is of little solace to a foreign 
pro se corporate defendant who has not been apprised of the availability of this procedure.  
 
A Final Remark on Finality 
 
The issue of notice was central to the court’s analysis in USA v. Shield. However, whether or 
not service was properly effected begs the question of whether the corporate defendants 
were afforded basic or fundamental rights of natural justice under the Utah federal rules of 
court, after their Utah Counsel were removed as counsel of record. Mr. Sheridan’s 
explanation for not responding to his former Utah Counsel was that he was involved in an 
head on accident in 1997 while riding in a taxi which affected him both physically and 
mentally and affected his recollection of events.77 However, the real issue is whether the fact 
that Shield and Anyox, having attorned to the Utah jurisdiction, thereafter were bound by all 
subsequent proceedings. Clearly, Justice Herman considered the mis-delivery of some of the 
court documents, including the motion for summary judgment, as “procedural irregularities” 
which did not raise a triable defence of breach of natural justice. The ratio of Herman, J.’s 
analysis is succinctly summarized as follows: 
 
[31] The allegation of a breach of natural justice cannot in my view, be sustained in this case. 
The defendants were aware of the legal proceedings in the United States and had retained 
Utah counsel. Their counsel had filed documents in court on their behalf and, as part of this, 
advised the court that the defendants' address was the corporate address. They would have 
received that information from the defendants. The defendants continued to maintain a 
mailbox at that address. Although two items were sent to the wrong address, the notification 
of the hearing date and a copy of the judgment were sent to the correct corporate address.  
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[32] Utah counsel obtained an order to remove themselves from the record because the 
defendants had not paid their bills and had not communicated with them. The defendants did 
nothing further although they were aware that there was ongoing litigation. Their actions 
suggest that they made a choice to walk away from the proceedings.  
 [33] Whether the defendants would be successful in setting aside the judgment in the United 
States would be a matter for the American courts to decide, but the existence of such a 
remedy is further support for the proposition that there has not been a breach of natural 
justice.  
 
The court’s analysis fails to consider that a foreign judgment must be final and res judicata in 
the originating jurisdiction, before it can be enforced in Canada. 78Granted, recent Canadian 
jurisprudence, notably, Pro Swing Inc. v. Elta Golf Inc. (currently on reserve before the Supreme 
Court of Canada) 79 may alter the finality requirement. However, aside from whether 
ineffective service constitutes a denial of natural justice, the circumstances under which 
summary judgment is granted through non-appearance merits further scrutiny by Canadian 
courts asked to enforce the foreign judgment. In USA v. Shield, once Utah counsel was 
removed as counsel of record, the corporate defendants were prohibited from filing any 
responding materials, including a response to Requests for Admissions or response to the 
motion for summary judgment, unless they retained legal counsel. Hence, the right to 
counsel is both substantive and procedural in nature. In fact, if it is mandated under the 
original forum's procedural rules, while in Ontario, a corporation has the right to seek leave 
to appoint an officer of the corporation to represent it in the proceedings.  
 
The defence of natural justice in the context of foreign default judgment enforcement 
involving pro se corporate defendants should include the following analytical inquiry: 
 
1. Was default judgment granted against a corporate defendant who previously 
attorned or submitted to the foreign court’s jurisdiction? 
2. Is the foreign judgment final or res judicata in the foreign jurisdiction (i.e. all 
rights of appeal and time limitations to set aside the foreign judgment have 
been exhausted)? 
3. If so, was default judgment granted against the corporate defendant in 
circumstances involving defective service under the foreign court’s 
procedure?  
4. If not, was the defendant represented by counsel at the time default 
judgment was granted? 
5. If the corporate defendant was unrepresented at any stage of the foreign 
proceedings, did the foreign court’s procedural system afford the corporate 
defendant a right of appearance and notice similar to those available in the 
Canadian domestic enforcing court? 
6. Was the foreign judgment obtained based upon a foreign rule of procedure 
intended to be used as a technical weapon to defeat the rights of pro se 
litigants to have their cases fairly judged on the merits? 
 
As one learned American judge has remarked: “The sword of Damocles causes harm 
because it hangs, not necessarily because it drops.” 80 Whether a defendant is a natural person 
or artificial entity, all Canadians deserve the benefit of the same procedural rights and 
recognized defences to enforcement of foreign judgments within the Canadian legal system. 
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